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After both summarizing recent empirical work and presenting new ob-
servations on each of the six phases of a civil lawsuit (forum, pretrial, settle-
ment, trial, judgment, and appeal), the authors draw a series of lessons for
understanding and using empirical methods in the study of the legal system's
operation. In so doing, they generate implications for current and projected
policy debates concerning litigation, while identifying areas that demand fur-
ther empirical work.
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 120
I. FORUM: HEREIN OF METHODOLOGY ...................... 121
A. Forum Selection .................................... 121
B. Forum Effect ....................................... 122
C. Methods of Empirical Research ..................... 125
II. PRETRIAL: HEREIN OF REFORM ........................... 129
A. Disposition Tim e ................................... 129
B. Mandatory Disclosure ............................... 132
C. Need for Empirical Research ....................... 134
III. SETTLEMENT: HEREIN OF SELECTION ..................... 135
A. Importance of Settlement .......................... 135
B. Settlement's Effect on Win Rates ................... 137
C. Settlement's Effect on Data Interpretation .......... 140
IV. TRIAL: HEREIN OF ANECDOTE ............................ 142
A. Decline of Civil Trial ............................... 142
B. Trial by jury or Judge .............................. 144
C. Persistence of Anecdote ............................ 146
V. JUDGMENT: HEREIN OF REALM OF UNKNOWNS ............ 147
A. Award of Damages .................................. 147
B. Foreigner Effect .................................... 148
C. Determinants of Trial Outcome .................... 149
VI. APPEAL: HEREIN OF ASSAULT ON UNKNOWNS ............. 150
A. Affirmance Effect ................................... 150
B. Plaintiff Effect ...................................... 152
C. Determinants of Appellate Outcome ................ 153
CONCLUSION ...................................................... 154
t James & Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. We would like to
thank for their helpful comments Steve Burbank, Michael Heise, and Marc Galanter.
tt Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell University.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Louis XVI's journal entry for July 14, 1789, was "Nothing."1 The
lawyer who today ignores empirical research risks giving in retrospect
the very same impression.
Law, admittedly, has long ignored empirical methods. Legal the-
ory, doctrine, and administration sprang from logic and intuition,
rather than from scientifically appraised experience, no matter what
Justice Holmes may have implied to the contrary.2 But a new era is
dawning. Empirical research should soon have a revolutionary impact
on the law.
We propose in this Article to discuss what the legal community is
beginning to learn about litigation, thanks to the recent application of
empirical methods to legal studies. 3 Synthesizing our earlier publica-
tions and extending them, we treat the six phases of a lawsuit: forum
selection, pretrial practice, settlement process, trial practice, judg-
ment entry, and appellate practice. For each of these phases, we offer
three perspectives: First, we overview the legal landscape of that
phase, while also providing a graph of new descriptive but unanalyzed
data as a snapshot of that phase-for example, a time trend in the
selection between state and federal forums. Second, summarizing
some prior work, published by ourselves or by others, we illustrate the
insights that empirical analysis can give into the realities of that
phase-for example, the sizable effect of forum on outcome. Third,
we draw from that work some lessons for understanding and using
empirical methods in the study of the legal system's operation 4 -for
I See Duc DE CASTRIES, LE TESTAMENT DE LA MONARCHIE: L'AGONIE DE LA ROYAUTV
192-93 (1959). But cf Interview by Francois-Xavier de Guibert with Paul Girault de Cour-
sac & Pierrette Girault de Coursac, in PAUL GIRAULT DE COURSAC & PIERRETrE GIRAULT DE
COURSAC, ENTRETIENS SUR Louis 16, at 144-45 (1990) (explaining that, in actuality, this
much maligned monarch was noting only that there had been no hunt that day).
2 See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881)
("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."). But cf O.W. Holmes,Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("For the rational study of the law the
black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics."). For a discussion of Holmes's approach to legal
reasoning, see generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes on the Logic of the Law, in TI-E PATH OF THE
LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 133 (Steven]. Bur-
ton ed., 2000).
3 See generally Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Proce-
dure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 105 (1997) (advocating "empirical research
about civil justice"); Symposium, Empirical Studies of Civil Procedure (pts. I & 11), LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 1 (presenting a variety of empirical insights on proce-
dural issues), Autumn 1988, at 1 (same).
4 See Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, 95 J. Am. STAT. ASS'N 665,
665 (2000) (distinguishing empirical studies of the legal system's operation from scientific
analysis used in individual legal cases), reprinted in STATISTICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 179, 179
(Adrian E. Raftery et al. eds., 2002).
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example, a taxonomy of the various empirical methodologies along
with their powers and limits.
I
FORUM: HEREIN OF METHODOLOGY
A. Forum Selection
"The name of the game is forum-shopping," as we (and countless
lawyers) have observed elsewhere.5 In the American civil litigation sys-
tem today, few cases reach trial. After perhaps some initial skirmish-
ing, most cases settle. Yet all lawsuits, regardless of their ultimate
disposition, entail forum selection.
In our earlier article, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, we
sketched the big picture along the following lines.6 We began by con-
sidering the individual case. The plaintiffs opening moves include
shopping for the most favorable forum, be it some state or the federal
system and be it any particular place within the jurisdiction. Then, we
noted, the defendant's parries and thrusts might include some forum-
shopping in return, possibly by removal or by a motion for change of
venue.7 Forum is worth fighting over because outcome often turns on
forum, as we shall soon show. When the dust settles, the case does
too-but on terms that reflect the results of the skirmishing. Thus,
the fight over forum can often be the critical dispute in the case.
When we cumulated these tendencies systemically, we observed
that forum selection is very important not only to the litigator, but
also to the office lawyer drafting contracts with an eye toward possible
future litigation.8 Not surprisingly, there exists an entire treatise de-
voted to the subject of forum selection. 9 Then, once in litigation, the
parties frequently dispute forum.10 Litigators deal with nearly as many
change-of-venue motions as trials." Thus, forum selection is a critical
concern of the legal system.
Now consider some new data on removal, as presented in Figure
1.12 Although the overwhelming majority of all cases are, of course,
5 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil ofForum-Shopping,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507, 1508 (1995) [hereinafter Forum-Shopping]. It appears that policy-
makers are joining the forum-selection game, as demonstrated by how the fighting over
the Patients' Bill of Rights legislation has come to center on the question of federal or state
forum. SeeJess Bravin & Milo Geyelin, Patients Face New Limits Under Compromise Bill, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2001, at A8.
6 Forum-Shopping, supra note 5, at 1508-09.
7 See id. at 1508.
8 See id. at 1508-09.
9 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDIcTION AND FORUM SELECTION (rev. 2d ed. 2001).
10 See id. § 1:02 (discussing specific cases involving disputes over forum).
I I See Forum-Shopping, supra note 5, at 1509 & n.3.
12 We describe the source of these data infra text accompanying note 43. We elimi-
nated asbestos cases from the Northern District of Ohio in 1990 to avoid the distortion
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initiated in state courts, 13 a surprising number of those cases are re-
moved to federal court. 14 The obvious story is one of forum selec-
tion.' 5 Within that story, however, is a surprising time trend. The
graph shows removal rates over the thirty-year period for which com-
puterized data exist. The upper line shows the proportion of diversity
cases that originated as removals. The lower line shows the propor-
tion of those removed cases that the district court remanded. The
obvious removal story, when altered to account for these time lines,
suggests the possibility of increasing abuse of removal as a forum-se-
lection device, a story that nicely conforms with anecdotal
impression. 16
B. Forum Effect
What is the effect of forum selection on the outcome of cases?
Practitioners and policymakers alike obviously have interest in this
question. We previously used empirical methods to investigate the ef-
fect of forum both in the context of removal from state to federal
court 17 and in the context of transfer of venue between federal district
courts.' 8 These methods entail much more analysis than a sterile data
compilation like Figure 1 but, as we shall explain, they involve as
much art as science.
Let us define "win rate" as the fraction of plaintiff wins among all
judgments for either plaintiff or defendant. Our Removal article shows
that plaintiffs' win rate in removed cases is very low, as compared to
state court cases and cases originating in federal court. For example,
created by their unusually high number. We do not provide data as to the remand rate
prior to 1979 because they are reliable only from fiscal 1979, when there were changes in
the Administrative Office's coding practices.
13 See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, AMERICAN COURTS 31-33 (2d ed. 2000).
14 See infra fig.1.
15 Moreover, between 1% and 2% of federal cases are transferred from one venue to
another. Interestingly, much like the removal rate, the transfer rate has evinced a signifi-
cant proportionate increase over recent decades. See Forum-Shopping, supra note 5, at
1526-29.
16 Compare, e.g., Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706-07
(M.D. La. 1999) (upholding removal by defendant insurers on tenuous basis of foreign
arbitrability), with, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. C93-32C (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 9, 1993) (remanding after removal by a nonparty-insurer). A prominent tactic
by defendants in tobacco litigation was to remove early and often, or even late in the game.
See, e.g., leyoub v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. C1V.A.96-0908, 1996 WL 544210, at *3 (W.D. La.
July 16, 1996) (removal after filing of complaint); Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122
F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (removal after verdict).
17 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998)
[hereinafter Removal].
18 Forum-Shopping, supra note 5; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Reply, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1551 (1997) (defending our thesis
on transfer).
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FIGURE 1: REMOVAL AND REMAND RATES IN FEDERAL DIvERsITY CASES
Removal Rate .................. Remand Rate
70 72 74 76 78 80 8'2 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00Calendar year of termination
Source Administrative Office data
the win rate in original diversity cases is 71%, but for removed diver-
sity cases is only 34%.19
The explanation could be the ready one based on the purpose of
removal: by removing, defendants defeat plaintiffs' forum advantage
and shift the biases, inconveniences, court quality, and procedural law
in the defendants' favor.20 Alternatively, the explanation might lie
not in forum impact but instead in case selection: removed cases may
simply be a set of weak cases involving (1) out-of-state defendants who
have satisfied or settled all but plaintiffs' weakest cases or (2) plaintiff
attorneys who have demonstrated their incompetence by already ex-
posing their clients to removal.21 Our analysis indicated that both fo-
rum impact and case selection are at work.22 Thus, forum really does
affect outcome, with removal taking the defendant to a much more
favorable forum. 23 After regression-a statistical technique that helps
to make removed cases comparable in kind to other cases and thus to
19 Removal, supra note 17, at 593, 594 tbl.1.
20 See id. at 599-602.
21 See id. at 602-06.
22 Id. at 606-07.
23 Id. at 607.
20021
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neutralize the case-selection effect24 -the impact of removal remains
sizable and significant. The statistical analysis indicates a residual re-
moval effect for diversity cases that would reduce a plaintiff's 50%
odds for success to about 39%.25 This 11% reduction from even odds
represents the impact of a federal forum on the case-the removal
effect.2 6
We also studied the transfer effect, whereby plaintiffs' win rate
drops markedly after transfer of venue. Plaintiffs' win rate in federal
civil cases drops from 58% in cases in which there is no transfer to
29% in transferred cases.27
For transfer, the loss of a favorable forum, which results in a
strongly shifted balance of inconveniences and a shift of local biases,
seems to be the primary explanation, because explanations based on
differences in the respective strengths of nontransferred and trans-
ferred cases are weak. 28 That is, the win rate declines largely because
the plaintiffs have lost a forum advantage. A plaintiff's 50% odds
would drop after transfer of venue to approximately 40%, after con-
trolling for all available variables.29
The comparison of removal and transfer suggests a consistent fo-
rum effect, whereby the plaintiffs' loss of forum advantage due to re-
moval or transfer reduces their chance of winning by about one-fifth.
Here the insight coming from empirical research is no surprise, as it
mainly confirms what most lawyers already knew. The name of the
game indeed is forum-shopping, and so all those lawyers out there are
not wasting their clients' money on forum fights.
This empirical result is working its way into further research. A
recent article of the doctrinal variety, in which the author attempts to
rationalize the prevailing forum-selection doctrines that permit all this
forum-shopping, builds on the established premise of a sizable forum
effect. 30 More recently, Professor Kimberly Moore undertook "the
first large-scale empirical analysis of patent enforcement in the federal
24 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1129-32 (1996) [hereinafter Xenophilia] (discussing the use of mul-
tivariate regression to study the effect of party citizenship on outcome). Multivariate re-
gression is a statistical technique that quantifies the influence of each of several factors
(independent variables) on the phenomenon being studied (dependent variable). See gen-
erally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAwYERS 350-479 (2d ed.
2001) (applying regression analysis to various legal issues).
25 Removal, supra note 17, at 606.
26 See id. at 606-07.
27 Forum-Shopping, supra note 5, at 1511-12.
28 See id. at 1514, 1516-17, 1524-25.
29 See id. at 1524 & n.39 (showing reduction to 40%); cf Removal, supra note 17, at 603
n.67 (showing reduction to 38% for diversity cases).
30 Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 168, 200 (2000).
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district courts."3 1 Consistent with the empirical results described in
this Article, she concludes that a wide choice of forum exists in patent
litigation, that parties actively work to select forum, and that forum
continues to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation:
32
"Forum shopping is alive and well in patent litigation.
33
C. Methods of Empirical Research
The social sciences-economics, psychology, sociology, law, and
so on-employ a variety of empirical methods. Empirical methods
are those that employ means for the systematic observation of experi-
ence in pursuit of inductive ends. The social scientists either create
experience by experiment or find experience in records, and then
they analyze this experience. In analyzing experience, the social
scientists might apply a variety of tools. The most powerful of these-
and the weapon that has enabled a revolution in legal studies-is sta-
tistics. Statistical analysis entails the assembly and organization of
plentiful data, which are almost always in the form of numbers, and
analysis of the data to reach inductive conclusions. 34 In the particular
arena of legal studies, the statistical research to date divides into three
groups, which differ in their method of data assembly.
First, there are statistical analyses of published judicial decisions. 35
In a sense, this group of studies represented a systematization of tradi-
tional legal research. Instead of reporting the fruits of years of subjec-
tive reading of opinions that had crossed one's desk, the legal scholar
turned to selecting randomly, coding tirelessly, and then analyzing
hundreds of cases. This new kind of research was a step forward. And
it has become much easier to do given the development of computer-
ized commercial databases of legal materials. But it is a very risky un-
dertaking.36 On the one hand, judicial decisions represent only the
very tip of the mass of grievances. 3 7 From that highpoint of actual
judicial decisions, it is tough to infer truths about the underlying mass
31 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Inno-
vation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001).
32 Id. at 937-38.
33 Id. at 937.
34 See generally Exchange, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (2002) (presenting several articles debating the utility and relevance of applying
social science rules of inference to empirical legal studies).
35 See, e.g., DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2000); Michael E. Solimine, The
Quiet Revolution in Personal jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. RE-v. 1 (1998).
36 See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 75 (2001) ("Under-
standing these diverse [determinants of publication] is crucial for.., legal academics and
social scientists who rely upon databases of published opinions to track judicial
behavior.").
37 See infra Part III.A.
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of disputes or what lies below disputes. On the other hand, published
decisions are a skewed sample of that tip of judicial decisions. A
rather small percentage of judicial decisions reach publication. This
shortcoming is becoming more serious. The publication rate even for
the heavily published decisions of the federal courts of appeals has
dipped from almost 50% in 1976 to just over 20% in 2000.38 This
reduced sample is certainly not representative of all judicial decisions.
For example, publication trends skew seriously toward publication of
reversals rather than affirmances: federal courts of appeals' civil deci-
sions show an 82% affirmance rate for all appeals from tried judg-
ments, but their published decisions in comparable cases show only a
63% affirmance rate. 39
Second, the real heroes of empirical research create their own data
for their subsequent statistical analyses. 40 They might do this by ex-
perimental work or by archival research. That is, they might, for ex-
ample, feed a series of simulated cases to a number of mockjuries. Or
they might spend months stumbling around in dusty court files, and
then go out in the field to uncover each case's real facts to which the
file coldly alludes. These methods have long been possible, and for
just as long they have gone rarely employed. And that situation will
persist into the future. Basically, the reason is that this kind of work is
a drag. It voraciously consumes time and money. Moreover, there is
no one to do it. Law-trained persons are unsuited by temperament
and training. High opportunity cost and low professional reward also
disincline them. Non-law-trained persons are, well, not trained in law.
Social scientists have plenty to study that does not require the courage
and effort of venturing into the mysterious realm of the law.
Third, the most promising group of statistical studies involves
analyses of publicly available, usually governmental, databases. 41 One
could view this approach as a way to overcome the limits and risks of
published-decision research. Or one could view it as a free-riding ver-
sion of the heroic approach. It is both, because it yields valid results
38 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 120, on file with authors) [hereinafter Plaintiphobia].
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (Univ. of Chi. Press
1971) (1966); see also John Kaplan, Book Review, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 475 (1967) (reviewing
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra); Michael H. Walsh, The American Jury: A Reassessment, 79 YALE L.J.
142 (1969) (book review) (same). See generally Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Ameri-
can Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 323 (1991) (assessing the historical
impact of The American Jury on legal and social science research).
41 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not
Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 577, 577 (describing "a low cost
bricolage strategy of trying to capture, refine, and juxtapose scattered data already in the
public domain").
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by feasible means. Broad and growing databases are available at no
cost. Access is easy, especially given the Internet's increasing power.
Inexpensive but sophisticated commercial statistical software now
exists, rendering the analysis step more achievable. In short, every-
thing is in place for an explosion of empirical work. So it is this group
of statistical studies that should have the biggest impact on the law.
As explicit illustrations of this third group, consider the foregoing
studies of data on forum selection, by us and by Kimberly Moore. 42
Where did all that stuff come from? It came from data gathered by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, assembled by
the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research. 43 We shall be using this
one body of data throughout this Article. In an earlier article, we de-
scribed the database, and its strengths and weaknesses, in the follow-
ing way.44
These data convey details of all cases terminated in the federal
courts since fiscal 1970. When any civil case terminates in a federal
district court or court of appeals, the court clerk transmits to the Ad-
ministrative Office a form containing information about the case. 45
The forms include, inter alia, data regarding the names of the parties,
the subject-matter category and the jurisdictional basis of the case, the
case's origin in the district as original or removed or transferred, the
amount demanded, the dates of filing and termination in the district
court or the court of appeals, the procedural stage of the case at ter-
mination, the procedural method of disposition, and, if the court en-
tered judgment or reached decision, the prevailing party and the
relief granted.46 Thus, the computerized database, compiled from
these forms, contains data concerning all of the millions of federal
civil cases over many years from the whole country.
42 See Removal, supra note 17; Forum-Shopping, supra note 5; Moore, supra note 31.
43 See 11 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCE-
DURES transmittal 64, at 11-18 to -28 (Mar. 1, 1985) (district court); 11 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, STATISTICS MANUAL ch. I, at 7-43 (June 1989) (court of appeals). For a com-
plete description of the Administrative Office database, see INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM
FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
1970-1997, ICPSR 8429 (1998). For easy access to part of this database, see Theodore
Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry, at http://empiri-
cal.law.cornell.edu (last modified Sept. 20, 2002), which is discussed in Theodore Eisen-
berg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996). For a more
detailed discussion of this database's strengths and weaknesses, see Removal, supra note 17,
at 585-87; Frank B. Cross, Comparative Judicial Databases, 83 JUDICATURE 248 (2000);
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99
MICH. L. REv. 365, 380-83 (2000).
44 Removal, supra note 17, at 585-87.
45 Id. at 585.
46 Id.
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In the aggregate, the data appear reliable. Still, data of such vast
coverage, gathered under sometimes confusing instructions, must in-
volve minor gaps and misclassifications. The data were entered by many
different people over an extended period, 47 although this dispersion
at least would neutralize mistakes and biases. Also, the standards for
coding have changed over time,48 which necessitates careful attention.
Only in fiscal 1979 did the Administrative Office start to record which
party prevailed by judgment in the trial court. In fiscal 1986 it began
to indicate meaningfully the citizenship of the two principal parties in
diversity cases as well as their corporate or individual status.
When working with outcomes, one faces a difficulty in dealing
with formal wins. This database records only formal outcome, as in
judgment for plaintiff or defendant. 49 So a formal loss, which may
have been worthwhile for the plaintiff because of its deterrent effect
or other long-run benefit, counts as a loss. And a formal win, which
may have resulted in an unexpectedly small or economically insuffi-
cient recovery, still counts as a win. Nevertheless, formal outcomes,
especially when averaged over all cases for many years, can tell the
researcher quite a bit.
Yet another difficulty lies in limiting the focus to technical judg-
ments. Many grievances are abandoned, claims satisfied, and disputes
settled. Most litigated cases settle or terminate in some manner, short
of judgment, that prevents ascertaining the winner from afar. Never-
theless, remember that judgments comprise much more than trial
outcomes. For Administrative Office purposes, judgments might be
the result of adjudication, consent, or default, although they normally
do not include voluntary dismissals or dismissals for lack of prosecu-
tion. 50 Again, then, although the researcher must keep the data's lim-
itations in mind, the study of judgments can yield much information.
Most unfortunately, the Administrative Office data do not con-
tain many other things one would like to know. They show no particu-
lars of each lawsuit.51 For example, although the Administrative
Office form distinguishes among many subject-matter categories, in-
cluding branches of tort such as medical malpractice and motor vehi-
cle, it does not distinguish among types of claims within the
categories. 52 This failing is an important limitation, because out-
comes depend heavily on the type of case. One must always control
for the case category. But one would always like to control on a finer
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 586.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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level. More generally, the Administrative Office's data are just a
bunch of codes about a limited number of case features. This situa-
tion restricts what one can study about the legal system, and surely
makes risky any behavioral inferences one might draw therefrom. But
these data are markedly better than nothing, and other databases do
and will exist for the study of other legal matters.
II
PRETRLAL: HEREIN OF REFORM
A. Disposition Time
The pretrial phase of litigation obviously is the lengthiest phase.
Naturally, then, it has been the focus of reform efforts to speed up
litigation. Reform has overhauled pleading and motion practice,
while adding disclosure, discovery, and conference mechanisms. Just
as naturally, one would think, the reformers would have demanded
empirical groundwork. But they have not. Instead, they have pro-
ceeded largely on the basis of logic and intuition.
It is also not surprising that reformers focus on delay in litigation,
whether in the pretrial phase or in the other phases of a lawsuit. "De-
lay in the courts is unqualifiedly bad."53 Justice delayed is justice de-
nied, after all. And there is plenty of delay for everyone.
Figure 2 shows delay, although it does not support a view that the
problem has increased recently. The upper dashed line shows the av-
erage time from filing to termination for those cases that the procedu-
ral progress code indicates were resolved during or after trial. More
importantly, the lower dashed line shows the time from filing to termi-
nation for the much more numerous cases resolved before trial be-
gins. 54 These untried cases do not take that long to reach
termination, and the mean length of time to termination has not in-
creased over the years despite the considerable increase in the courts'
caseload as indicated by the solid line.55
Moreover, there is good reason to proceed with wariness before
accepting the truth either of old maxims about delay or of new pro-
posals for reform based merely on logic and intuition. Both recent
theoretical work and recent empirical study argue for such caution.
53 HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN, JR. & BERNARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT, at xxii
(2d ed. 1978).
54 The Administrative Office data underlying Figure 2 show that during the whole
thirty-year period, 95% of terminations occurred before trial began. Over that time, the
percentage has been increasing, as the incidence of trial has decreased.
55 The solid line in Figure 2 shows the raw number of terminated cases per year.
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FIGURE 2: TIME TO TERMINATION OF FEDERAL C111L CASES
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Source. Administrative Office data
Theoretical work argues that delay is not necessarily an evil. 5 6 De-
lay is an unavoidable feature of life, and it is not an evil in itself.5 7 The
only evil is excessive delay, where excessive means that the costs of
delay outweigh its benefits. 58 The costs of figuratively queuing to try a
case tend to be exaggerated, because the parties can engage in other
pursuits while waiting.5 9 Queuing in fact has some benefits, such as
lowering the demand for trials.60
Another study, both empirical and theoretical, shows that the
many obvious reforms simply have not worked and will not work to
reduce delay. 61 The study's basic insight is that any reduction in delay
increases the incentive to litigate and reduces the parties' incentives
to settle, with the consequent increase in litigation offsetting the re-
56 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.12 (5th ed. 1998); Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 445-48 (1973).
57 See Posner, supra note 56, at 445-46.
58 See id. at 445.
59 See POSNER, supra note 56, § 21.12, at 637.
60 See id. § 21.12, at 637-38.
61 See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV.
527 (1989); cf John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVILJUSTICE IN CRISIS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999)
(questioning more generally the efficacy of procedural reform).
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duction in delay.62 Most attempts at reform, such as adding judges,
will only increase the number of trials, rather than decrease the time
to disposition. Adding judges to the system to reduce congestion is
similar to expanding the number of freeway lanes, an improvement
that would draw traffic off the side streets and from public transporta-
tion.63 More cases might flow into the system, and the lesser burden
of litigating might reduce the subsequent incentives to settle, so the
increased number of judges would adjudicate at basically the same
speed.
Empirical work in this area is rare because of the scarcity of data
and the inherently complex nature of the relevant research questions.
It is unclear even what to measure, no less how to measure in a con-
trolled way. However, the empirical work that exists is consistently dis-
couraging for reformers. A recent study utilized state court data to
demonstrate that the use of particular processes, such as alternative
dispute resolution (ADR), does not correlate with shortened disposi-
tion times, while the factors that do so correlate, such as forum locale
and case category, are simply beyond the reach of process-oriented
reform.64
Some related empirical work that we have done further counsels
caution. Using the Administrative Office database of federal civil
cases, but limiting our search to sizable tort and contract categories
that clearly involved a choice between jury and judge trial, we showed
that judge-tried cases last longer than jury-tried cases over their lives
on the docket even though actual jury trials themselves proceed twice
as slowly as judge trials: the mean judge-tried case spends 755 days on
the district court docket, while the mean jury-tried case terminates in
678 days. 65 That is, although most commentators have assumed that
the wait in the jury queue was longer than the wait for a judge's trial
and decision, 66 the reality is the opposite. The most likely explanation
is that the press of other duties leads judges to interrupt bench trials
and postpone their eventual decisions.67 Consequently, any reform
62 See Priest, supra note 61, at 533-39.
63 See Posner, supra note 56, at 448.
64 See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813 (2000).
65 Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which Is Speedier?,
79JUDICATURE 176, 176-78 (1996) [hereinafter Speed].
66 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 56, § 21.13, at 641 ("Court queues are almost always
greatest for parties seeking civil jury trials .... Parties are . . . 'charged' more for jury trials
by being made to wait in line longer."); Leon Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual
Fall, 11 Lov. L. REV. 243, 255-56 (1963) (similar implication); see also GORDON BERMANT,
JOE S. CECIL, ALAN J. CHASET, E. ALLAN LIND & PATRICIA A. LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH AND THE BAR 43-45 (1981) (reporting
survey results).
67 Speed, supra note 65, at 199.
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aimed at restricting jury trials in order to reduce delay68 is apt to be
counterproductive. Thus, we added the note of caution that assump-
tions about delay are risky, making empirical study a necessity.
B. Mandatory Disclosure
One of the most controversial pretrial reforms of recent times has
been mandatory disclosure. 69 The federal rulemakers introduced this
new mechanism in 1993.70 Parties now must disclose certain core in-
formation that elaborates on the pleaded facts, without awaiting a dis-
covery request. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), there
are three distinct types of disclosure: initial disclosures, expert infor-
mation, and pretrial disclosures.7'
In particular, the 1993 version of Rule 26(a) (1) required disclo-
sure, as the so-called initial disclosures, of routine evidentiary and in-
surance matters. These matters comprised (1) individuals "likely to
have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings," (2) documents and things "in the pos-
session, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings," (3) computation of
claimed damages, and (4) insurance agreements that might cover part
or all of an eventual judgment.72 However, districts by local rule
could alter these initial disclosure obligations.73 Indeed, almost half
the districts opted out of the standard scheme by diminishing initial
disclosure to some degree.7 4
The federal rulemakers' introduction of mandatory disclosure
aimed at achieving some savings in delay and expense, and also at
moderating litigants' adversarial behavior in the pretrial process.75
They credited as their inspiration the anecdotal advocacy of disclosure
in law review articles by Professor Wayne Brazil and by Judge William
68 See Heise, supra note 64, at 815-16 (describing two broad approaches to procedural
reform).
.69 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Mora-
torium, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 845-46 (1993) ("[O]ne would have thought both that care
in drafting should produce an easily comprehensible rule and that a vehicle of cultural
change should not be riddled with escape hatches."); see also Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Delay
and Empirical Data: A Response to Professor Heise, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 235, 237-38, 244-46
(2000) (observing the controversy surrounding the 1993 amendment of Rule 26).
70 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993 amendment).
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1993) (amended 2000).
73 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000).
74 See DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (1998).
75 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993 amendment).
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Schwarzer.76 However, critics claimed that disclosure, in its routine
operation and by the consequent disputes, would actually increase de-
lays and expenses.7 7 Also, critics argued that disclosure would
counterproductively clash with the prevailing adversary system and
with the Rules' notice pleading scheme. 78 After the rulemakers' intro-
duction of disclosure, the unabating controversy prompted them fi-
nally to commission empirical studies from both the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC)7 9 and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice (RAND). 80
The FJC reported a survey of two thousand attorneys involved in
one thousand general civil cases terminated in 1996 that were likely to
have some discovery activities, a survey with a 59% response rate.8 '
Most of the responding attorneys felt that initial disclosure had no
effect on delay or fairness, but, of those who detected effects, more
attorneys believed the effects to be positive than negative.8 2 Also, the
respondents rarely reported fears of increased satellite litigation.8 3 Fi-
nally, by statistical analysis of its small sample of cases, the FJC found
that the use of initial disclosure tended to shorten actual disposition
time.8 4
The RAND report used its preexisting data to compare a small
group of district courts with local rules requiring some type of disclo-
sure during 1992-1993 to another small group with no such rules.85
The data included the attorneys' subjective measures of satisfaction
and sense of fairness, as well as objective measures of attorneys' hours
worked and case disposition time.86 RAND found no significant effect
76 See id. (citing Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1348 (1978), and William W Schwarzer, The
Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721-23
(1989)).
77 See, e.g., Order of April 22, 1993, 507 U.S. 1089, 1099 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78 See, e.g., Alfred W. Cortese Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change in the Rules Draws Fire,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25, 26.
79 THOMAS E. WILLGING, JOHN SHAPARD, DONNA STIENSTRA & DEAN MILETICH, FED. JU-
DICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE:
A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES (1997).
80 JAMES S. KAKALIK, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO,
NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA (1998).
81 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 79, at 1, app. A at 57-58.
82 Id. at 26 & tbl.17.
83 See id. at 27.
84 See id. at 55.
85 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 80, at 1-3. RAND had gathered the data at the request
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
as part of an independent evaluation mandated by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See
id. at v, xv & n.l. For a description of the data set, see id. at 3-5.
86 See id. at 5-8, 6 n.4.
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of disclosure on fairness sensed, hours worked, or disposition time,
but mandatory disclosure did markedly lower attorney satisfaction. 87
In 2000, based on these two imperfect studies, the rulemakers
amended Rule 26(a) (1) to prohibit district courts from opting out of
the initial disclosure requirements, to exempt eight specified catego-
ries of proceedings from initial disclosure, and, most importantly, to
change the scope of the initial disclosure obligations. 8 Now, a party
need only disclose witnesses, and documents and things in the party's
custody or control, "that the disclosing party may use to support its
claims or defenses." 89 Such disclosures of favorable information need
no longer be triggered by "disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleadings."90
Kuo-Chang Huang, a graduate student at Cornell Law School,
recognized the shortcomings of the two previous studies and per-
formed his own clever study of disclosure using the Administrative Of-
fice data.91 Among other statistical analyses, he "vertically" compared
disposition time in the years before a district court required initial
disclosure with disposition time after adoption of such disclosure.92
He also "horizontally" compared district courts that required initial
disclosure with district courts that had opted out of such disclosure.93
Applying multivariate regression, Huang showed that adoption of ini-
tial disclosure tended slightly but significantly to slow down disposi-
tion.9 4 He concluded that, because it has almost no practical effects,
this controversial device has no justification. 95 Thus, the rulemakers
would have been better advised just to eliminate initial disclosure.96
C. Need for Empirical Research
Our lesson here is an obvious one, and others have made it al-
ready. Not only do practitioners and students need to attend to em-
87 See id. at 48-52.
88 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1); FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2000
amendment).
89 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
90 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2000 amendment) (discuss-
ing the requirement of identification of "witnesses and documents that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses"), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) (1993) (amended
2000) (incorporating the "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the plead-
ings" standard for matter subject to initial disclosure).
91 Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatoy Disclosure: A Controversial Device with No Effects, 21
PACE L. REV. 203 (2000).
92 Id. at 242-44.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 255, 263.
95 Id. at 262-64.
96 Id. at 264; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The
Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform, "LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at
197, 225-28 (questioning the justifications for and utility of the federal disclosure rules).
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pirical methods, but so do commentators on the legal system ranging
from academics to journalists. Most of all, empirical studies must be
put before those who govern the system. Indeed, there is a "compel-
ling need for public policymakers to commission expert, independent
evaluations that systematically gather, analyze, and synthesize depend-
able empirical data."97 The data might come from archival research,
or they might even come from field experiments conducted with the
help of local rules.98
Then the policymakers must "closely consult and carefully apply
the material assembled when reforming civil justice."99 There is a de-
mand-side problem as well as a supply-side problem with empirical
studies: almost nobody in power pays attention to the few studies that
do exist. 100 The courts' strange experience with mandatory disclosure
serves as a fine example of what can go wrong.
III
SETTLEMENT: HEREIN OF SELECTION
A. Importance of Settlement
Most lawsuits do not make it all the way through the pretrial prac-
tice we have just examined. Indeed, most disputes do not even be-
come lawsuits. Injured persons abandon or settle the overwhelming
majority of grievances at some point along the line. 01
A useful image is the so-called grievance pyramid on the next
page. This image represents, as one progresses up the steps of the
pyramid, how the whole realm of experiences narrows to disputes, a
subset that produces in turn those selected cases we can study in
archives like the Administrative Office database. Infinite experiences
produce countless disputes, which yield few cases. For example, only
a small percentage of grievances ripen into claims, by the aggrieved's
voicing the grievance to the injurer; most aggrieved persons accept
their injury, taking it as part of life or just figuring that no remedy is
available; tellingly, the theorists in this subject sometimes refer to ac-
ceptance as "lumping it." Similarly, most disputants never make it to a
lawyer, much less to a courthouse.
97 Tobias, supra note 69, at 244.
98 See id. at 242 & n.36, 245 & n.46. But see Garth, supra note 3, at 106-13 (cataloguing
the difficulties of such reform-oriented research).
99 Tobias, supra note 69, at 249.
100 See Michael Heise, The Future of Civil Justice Reform and Empirical Legal Scholarship: A
Reply, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 251, 251-54 (2000).
101 In this subpart, we draw heavily from RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN
M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 5-11 (7th ed. Supp.
2002).
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The slope of the sides of the pyramid is quite gentle. That is, a
huge percentage of situations leaves the pyramid at each step upward.
A survey of more than five thousand households indicated that during
the previous three years just over a third of them had perceived one
or more grievances of certain litigable types; 71.8% of those griev-
ances produced a claim informally; 63.0% of those claims met an ini-
tial rebuff to produce a dispute; and 11.2% of those disputes resulted
in filing a lawsuit.102 Indeed, these percentages are exaggeratedly
high, because the survey limited its inquiries to grievances involving
$1000 or more. 03 But even for such substantial grievances, litigation
is by no means a knee-jerk or common reaction in America, as overall
only about 5% of the survey's grievances ultimately resulted in a court
filing. 104
In the world of litigation at the top of the pyramid, the sides'
slope remains gentle. Of the relatively few filed cases, only a small
percentage make it through the procedural system to a contested
judgment. We can use the Administrative Office database to look at
all the 259,637 federal civil cases terminated during fiscal 2000. Of
these, the parties settled at least 66.7% in one way or another; the
court adjudicated approximately 12.9% at the pretrial stage, as by a
motion under Rule 12 or 56, and about 1.9% at the trial stage; and the
other 18.5% of the cases fell into a welter of other disposition method
codes, such as remand or transfer to another court, whereby most will
result in an eventual settlement rather than a final adjudication. That
is, if the "other" grouping grows, settlement grows as well.
Figure 3 shows the fate of filed cases over the years, dividing all
civil cases among the above four sets of disposition methods, the cod-
1(2 See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer &Joel
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 86 (1983).
103 Id. at 80-81.
104 See id. at 87 fig.2.
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ing of which became consistent enough to use only in fiscal 1979. It
tells a story of the continuing dominance of settlement. Indeed, given
that most "other" dispositions result in eventual settlement, the graph
implies a growing dominance of settlement, against a backdrop of a
diminishing role for adjudication and especially for civil trial.
FIGURE 3: METHOD OF DISPOSITION IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES
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B. Settlement's Effect on Win Rates
A basic truth, then, is that settlement is numerically much more
important than actual litigation. Yet empirical research tends to focus
on the readily observable, and litigation is much more observable
than settlement. Indeed, judgment is the most observable feature of
litigation. Therefore, the popular form of recent empirical studies in-
volves examining the parties' success in obtaining judgment after
litigation.105
Not only are such judgment data readily available, but they ap-
pear to be full of meaning as well. An analyst usually uses win-rate
data to get at some underlying factor affecting outcome generally,
such as some substantive or procedural rule or some nonlegal factor
105 This subpart draws heavily from Removal, supra note 17, at 587-91.
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favoring one side or the other in the set of all disputes. Yet this inter-
pretive step based on win-rate data can easily lead the analyst astray,
because win-rate data inherently entail near-fatal ambiguity.10 6
The ambiguity arises from the selection effect of the settlement pro-
cess, whereby the parties' selection of the cases to push through litiga-
tion produces a biased sample from the mass of underlying
disputes.107 More specifically, disputes and cases that clearly favor ei-
ther the plaintiff or the defendant tend to settle readily, because both
sides can save costs by settling in light of their knowledge of the appli-
cable law and all other aspects of the case.' 08 Difficult cases falling
close to the applicable decisional criterion tend not to settle, because
the parties are more likely to disagree substantially in their predicted
outcomes. 10 9 These unsettled close cases fall more or less equally on
either side of the criterion, regardless of the position of that criterion
and regardless of the underlying distribution of disputes. 110 Thus,
even if, say, the legal criterion, such as strict liability, highly favors
plaintiffs, one might not observe a plaintiff win rate well above 50%.
Instead, case selection will leave for adjudication a residue of unset-
tled close cases, which consequently exhibit some nonextreme equi-
librium win rate. In other words, the case-selection effect means that
the win rate reveals something about the set of adjudged cases, a uni-
verse dominated by close cases-but reveals little about the underly-
ing, variegated mass of disputes and cases.
According to case-selection effect theory, any distinction between
two streams of cases that the parties evaluate without systematic inac-
curacy should lead to no difference in adjudicated win rates. Indeed,
under simplifying assumptions, and as a limiting implication, the the-
ory suggests a trial win rate of 50% for both streams. But the theory
does not actually predict any universal win rate, or that two streams'
rates will be precisely the same. Reality is too complicated to produce
a 50% win rate. What factors might lead to win rates different from
50%? There are three types of such factors.
First, different stakes to the parties is the most common explana-
tion of win rates that depart from the idealized predictions of case-
106 A disturbing example lies in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-300
(7th Cir. 1995), in which Chief Judge Posner used the defendant drug companies' 92.3%
win rate in thirteen prior cases brought by other hemophiliacs to justify denial of class-
action status to the hemophiliac plaintiffs in the case at bar. See generally JOEL BEST,
DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS 162-66 (2001) (contrasting cynical approach to statistics with
naive approach).
107 For background material regarding selection effect, see sources cited in Removal,
supra note 17, at 588 n.21.
108 Id. at 588.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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selection effect. 1 ' The doctor whose reputation may be harmed will
have more at stake than the dollars that one plaintiff seeks. The com-
pany defending a product liability action will have more at stake than
the money sought in the particular case. Such differential stakes may
make defendants more willing to settle the plaintiffs' stronger cases,
and so lead to plaintiffs' win rates lower than either 50% or whatever
other level one expects absent the differential stakes. Analogously,
greater stakes to plaintiffs may raise their win rates.
Many other factors are of this contextual type, in that they all
constitute real-world complications that alter the economic model's
simplified assumptions and consequently its purified predictions. Il-
lustratively, for a stream of cases in which the main dispute concerns
damages based on clear liability, obviously the win rate would in-
crease. Similarly, differences in the two sides' access to information
and competence in forecasting would affect the win rate. Or if the
two streams of cases under study differ in costs of litigating or in
awards upon winning, win rates would not equalize.
Second, another type of powerful explanation of aberrant win
rates would be the parties' mutual misperceptions about the prevail-
ing standard of decision. If the parties perceive the adjudicator to be
favorable to the plaintiff, but the adjudicator turns out not to be, then
the supposedly close cases would turn out to be losers and the win rate
would drop. Similarly, if the adjudicator appears to be neutral, but
turns out to be unfavorable to the plaintiff, then the win rate would
drop. Imagined biases or unperceived biases of the adjudicator there-
fore affect win rate.
The direction of the effect on win rate is opposite to the mis-
perception. A suppressed win rate might not mean that plaintiffs suf-
fer a disadvantage, but merely that plaintiffs are not as advantaged as
the parties think. A slanted win rate might therefore mean almost the
opposite of what it seems to mean. This complexity adds a cruel twist
to win-rate data's inherent ambiguity.
Third, average strength of the cases is a type of factor different in
kind from the contextual factors and from misperception. This factor
draws on the reassuring thought that a stream of stronger claims
should have a higher win rate than a stream of weaker claims. The
claims' strength could lie in favorable facts or in an easy legal crite-
rion, or it could result from unevenly matched adversaries or from a
biased adjudicator. In other words, case-selection effect is merely a
tendency to remove meaning from outcome data, but it may not com-
pletely do so. Thus, for example, our earlier work found that transfer
111 See, e.g., sources cited id. at 589 n.25.
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of venue out of a forum favorable to the plaintiff results, despite settle-
ment's effect, in a lowered win rate."12
Generally, the factor of case strength is at play throughout the
dispute-resolution process. At the earlier termination stages, this fac-
tor enjoys greater influence, so there one can infer with greater confi-
dence from win rates.113 But its weight tends to diminish as
settlement weeds out the cases, so that in trial data this factor has
largely but not completely disappeared. Still, a strong positive correla-
tion exists between win rates on pretrial motion and at trial.114 Also,
win rates for settlements and for judgments seem to correlate. 115
In sum, our work has shown that one should not expect 50% win
rates.1 16 Real-world win rates are complicated to interpret, because of
the interplay of the aforementioned factors. Understanding those fac-
tors is therefore essential. For example, as already noted, we have
shown that the plaintiffs' win rate in federal civil cases is 58% in cases
in which there is no transfer and 29% in transferred cases." 7 Interest-
ingly, the comparable win rate for termination at early procedural
stages is 73% in nontransfer cases and 26% in transfer cases, while the
comparable win rates at trial are 45% and 47%.118 Given settlement's
role in causing win rates to converge but not to equalize as the litiga-
tion process progresses, these two streams of nontransfer and transfer
cases retain a potentially meaningful difference.
C. Settlement's Effect on Data Interpretation
Win rates, as just suggested, may retain residual meaning, which
the settlement process has not obliterated. The challenge is to tease
out the residual meaning in win-rate data by removing the inherent
case-selection ambiguities-thereby isolating, say, the remaining im-
plications of the case-strength factor. That is, careful research and
theorizing can often succeed in overcoming the effect of
settlement. "19
112 See supra Part I.B.
113 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Litiga-
tion Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433,
445-47 (1996) (showing downward time trend in product liability win rate that is observa-
ble in earlier stages but not at trial).
114 See Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff Success Rates Before Trial
and at Trial, 154J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y ser. A, pt. 1, at 111 (1991).
115 See Theodore Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication: Kritzer on Brokers
and Deals, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 275, 292-93 & n.64 (1994).
116 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990).
117 See supra text accompanying note 27.
118 See Forum-Shopping, supra note 5, at 1520 tbl.1.
119 This subpart draws heavily from Removal, supra note 17, at 591-92.
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For example, as seen in our transfer data,120 we have found what
may be called a refraction effect, whereby in the progress of litigation a
case stream's win rate usually approaches some nonextreme trial win
rate. 12' In other words, the refraction effect reflects the tendency of
clear cases to drop out as litigation progresses, so that the win rates at
the various pretrial stages progressively close in on that nonextreme
trial win rate. The trial win rate may not convey much meaning by
itself, making it often dangerous to work only with trial data. Never-
theless, thanks to the refraction effect, the trial data's meaning be-
comes clearer as one tracks back to the mass of underlying cases and
disputes.
More generally, the first step of careful research and theorizing
involves making sure that the comparison is apples to apples. The
most useful tool here is regression.' 22 Multivariate regression works to
segregate the independent effects of various variables, such as year
and case category, on win rates. 123 The dependent variable here-
what one is trying to explain-is whether the judgment is a win or a
loss for plaintiff. The regression should use a broad set of indepen-
dent variables-factors that may affect the win rate-as controls. This
statistical technique helps to ensure that any comparison of win rates
rests on cases that are as similar as possible.
The second step involves formulating the possible explanations of
the observed phenomenon and then testing them by investigating ad-
ditional variables. For example, if a possible explanation of a low rate
of success is inept counsel, one might compare win rates for corporate
and individual parties, to see if the observed effect is more pro-
nounced for individuals with their possibly less qualified counsel.
Such a process can eliminate many possible explanations.
The third step involves application of a plausibility screen to the
surviving explanations. Some will just make much more sense than
others, fitting better within the framework of accumulated experience
and knowledge. For example, lower conviction rates in judge-tried
criminal cases (50%) than injury-tried criminal cases (80%) probably
do not mean that the judges rather than juries are overly sympathetic
to the accused; instead, case selection is the more plausible explana-
tion, as criminal defendants with solid defenses tend to prefer judge
120 See supra text accompanying note 118.
121 SeeJoel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theo-
ries of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451, 471-74 (1998) (providing evidence of refraction
effect). On the disappearance of the refraction effect on appeal, see Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Tial: Defendants'Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 125, 135 n.19 (2001) [hereinafter Defendants'Advantage].
122 See supra note 24.
12- See supra note 24.
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trials.1 24 Such reliance on experience and knowledge may not sound
too scientific. That is true. In fact, the preceding two steps were less
rigorous than they may have sounded.
Our point, indeed, is that this form of analysis is as much art as
science. And it is a difficult and subjective art. For example, surely
there would be a predilection to accept the first plausible explanation,
as one works through the straightforward explanations of case
strength before wrestling with the more indirect case-selection contex-
tual explanations or resorting to convoluted explanations based on
parties' misperceptions. Such predilection is dangerous. Caveat
emptor accordingly applies to this form of art.
Consider why empirical studies tend to be surprising. Unlike law
and economics, which reassuringly tends to find that the common law
makes sense, law and empirical methods' studies tend to be shocking.
They tend to upset so-called common knowledge. This tendency is
not attributable only to prevailing ignorance. It is more an effect of
the researchers' motivations to look for jarring patterns. Researchers
see lots of numbers, but they pause on and later report on the num-
bers that startle. For example, ifjury-tried cases did spend more time
on the docket, as most people supposed, we probably would not have
written up our results on disposition time.125 Yet any surprising em-
pirical result could be largely an artifact of the case-selection effect,
and consequently be unrevealing about the realities of the legal
system.
In sum, empirical research can provide valuable insights. But the
consumer of empirical research must cautiously verify that the re-
searchers had no axe to grind, that they truly immersed themselves in
the data, and that they explained their investigatory and reasoning
processes in detail. All this requires time and effort from the user and
the researchers. Both art and science demand no less.' 26
IV
TRIAL: HEREIN OF ANECDOTE
A. Decline of Civil Trial
As settlement and like dispositions have blossomed, the civil trial
has all but disappeared.' 2 7 Many have noted this trend, although
124 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJuy or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1165-66 (1992) [hereinafter Jury or Judge].
125 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
126 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Researching CivilJustice: Problems and Pitfalls, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 55 (discussing problems with the application of empiri-
cal research to public policy).
127 The trend of the vanishing civil trial is apparent from the Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts [hereinafter AO]. Over
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there is less agreement on cause. 128 Interestingly, and not noted else-
where, we find that the number of judge trials has recently fallen even
more precipitously than the number of jury trials.129 The latter devel-
opment is especially mysterious because both queues for trial pass
through the same person-the trial judge. 30
Figure 4 presents some suggestive data on these time trends. 131
The dashed lines show jury and judge trials as a percentage of all fed-
eral civil terminations. These percentages decreased with the passing
years. The solid line shows the increasing ratio of jury trials to judge
trials. For example, in 1979 there was one jury trial for every two
judge trials, and by 2000 there were more than two jury trials for every
judge trial. However, much more analysis would be necessary to get a
solid hold on the causes, or even on the real size of the decline given a
the years its Tables C-4, prepared with the procedural progress codes for cases terminated
during or after trial, show a steady decrease from almost 12% of civil terminations reaching
trial in the 1960s to the current levels approaching 2%. Compare AO, at 208 tbl.C-4 (1968)
(showing 11.8% rate), with AO, at 154 tbl.C-4 (2001) (showing 2.2% rate). As that period
progressed, the growing number of federal judges led to an increase in the absolute num-
ber of civil trials as the caseload grew, reaching a peak in fiscal 1985 of 12,570 trials accord-
ing to the AO's measure. See AO, at 308 tbl.C-4 (1985). However, civil trials per year have
since dropped to fewer than half that number, so today there are about as many civil trials
as there were in fiscal 1961. Compare AO, at 246 tbl.C-4 (1961) (showing 5,553 trials), with
AO, at 154 tbl.C-4 (2001) (showing 5,401 trials).
128 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 39, 46-48 (1996) (emphasizing growth of the
criminal trial docket); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1996) (emphasizing systemic pressure to
settle); Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35
ARIz. L. REV. 663, 669-72, 671 tbl.1, 677-78 (1993) (emphasizing, in part, the growth in
number and complexity of civil cases); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 526-39 (1986) (emphasizing judicial and cultural assump-
tions); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis.
L. REV. 631, 632-39 (emphasizing increase in judges' pretrial tasks); Hope Viner Samborn,
The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24-26, 27 (emphasizing push toward ADR).
129 See infra text accompanying note 131.
130 The explanation does not reside in a single case category such as jobs (Administra-
tive Office category #442), where the jury right has expanded in the recent past. The mass
of cases, without the jobs cases, shows virtually the same drop in the absolute and relative
use of judge trial. The explanation would have to be a broader one, such as judicial dis-
taste for a time-consuming task like bench trial. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
Or, as the disincentives to trial have increased, those litigants who prefer jury trial have
proved to be the more determined group.
131 We used the procedural progress codes of 7 and 9-termination during and after
jury trial-to define jury trial usage. See 11 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES transmittal 64, at 11-21 to -26 (Mar. 1, 1985) (district
court). However, we used disposition method code 9-judgment on court trial-to define
judge trial usage. Here we abandoned the procedural progress codes for judge trials be-
cause, unfortunately, the Administrative Office defines "trial" to include all contested pro-
ceedings in which evidence is introduced. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL
STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE 3:18 (1999). This definition would distort analysis of the
data by categorizing some motion hearings asjudge trials. Also unfortunately, the disposi-
tion method code did not become consistent until fiscal 1979.
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changing legal environment. And then there would be the conten-
tious issues surrounding the normative implications of the vanishing
civil trial and bench trial.
FIGURE 4: JURY AND JUDGE USAGE IN FEDERAL CML TRIALS
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B. Trial by Jury or Judge
The classic work on jury/judge differences is by Professors Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel.' 32 They addressed reliability (the ability to
treat like cases alike) ofjury decision making. Their questionnaires to
presiding judges in some 4000 actual state and federal civil jury trials
nationwide in the 1950s-asking the judges how they would decide
those same cases-yielded data showing a 78% agreement between
judge and jury on liability.'33 When compared to other human deci-
sion makers, the rate of agreement is more impressive than it first
appears. This 78% agreement rate is better than the rate of agree-
ment between scientists doing peer review, employment interviewers
ranking applicants, and psychiatrists and physicians diagnosing pa-
1-92 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 40, at 63-64; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the
Civil Juy, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063-68 (1964) (comparing jury verdicts and judges' de-
sired outcomes in surveyed trials). We draw this description of their work from Jury or
Judge, supra note 124, at 1153.
13, KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 40, at 63-64.
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tients, and almost as good as the 79% or 80% rate of agreement be-
tween judges themselves making sentencing decisions in an
experimental setting.134
Incidentally, when judge and jury did disagree in the Kalven and
Zeisel study, they exhibited no distinct pattern other than the juries'
very small tendency to favor plaintiffs relative to judges. The jury but
not the judge found for the plaintiff in 12% of the cases, while the
judge but not the jury found for the plaintiff in 10% of the cases. 135
A quarter-century later we performed the first large-scale compar-
ison of plaintiff win rates and recoveries in federal civil cases actually
tried before either juries or judges. 136 Unlike Kalven and Zeisel, we
compared outcomes in the stream of cases going through jury trial to
outcomes after bench trials, the two streams of course comprising dif-
ferent cases. 137 The cases all came from sizable tort and contract cate-
gories that clearly involved a choice between jury and judge trial. In
two of the most controversial areas of modern tort law, product liabil-
ity and medical malpractice, the win rates substantially differ from
other categories' win rates and in a surprising way: plaintiffs in these
two areas prevail after trial at a much higher rate before judges (48%)
than they do before juries (28%).138 Furthermore, in medical mal-
practice but not in product liability, the mean recovery in judge trials
is higher than the mean recovery in jury trials.139
These empirical results proved resistant to all simple explana-
tions, such as differences in the size of award explaining differences in
win rates. 140 So we considered the results in light of the parties' ability
to select which cases reach jury or judge trial. Lawyers entertain long-
standing perceptions of juries as biased and incompetent, relative to
judges.141 These perceptions have the consequence of a selection of
cases reaching jury trial that differs from the case selection reaching
judge trial. In particular, in certain categories of cases, lawyers view
134 See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 243, 246-48 (reporting research by Shari S. Diamond).
135 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 40, at 64.
136 Jury or Judge, supra note 124. Numerous smaller studies give fairly consistent sup-
port to our results. See Defendants'Advantage, supra note 121, at 144-45; Jury or Judge, supra
note 124, at 1151-55. The same is true in studies of specific case categories. See id. at 1154
n.78 (citing sources); Elizabeth Graddy, Juries and Unpredictability in Products Liability Dam-
age Awards, 23 LAW & Po'Y 29 (2001). But cf Moore, supra note 31 (performing a sophisti-
cated analysis of patent cases, involving field work to verify the Administrative Office's data,
and concluding that some significant jury/judge differences do exist in patent litigation);
Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who's Asking? (Mar. 27, 2002) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors) (similar).
137 Jury or Judge, supra note 124, at 1133.
138 Id. at 1125-26, 1137 tbl.3.
139 Id. at 1126, 1141 tbl.4.
140 See, e.g., id. at 1140-43.
141 See id. at 1149-51.
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the jury trial option as relatively favorable to plaintiffs.1 42 They then
settle cases in a way that leaves for trial by jury or judge a residue of
what they consider close cases, with juries accordingly seeing on aver-
age weaker cases.1 4 " But the perceptions turn out to be mispercep-
tions, as jury and judge turn out to perform similarly. There is no
evidence that juries are relatively biased or incompetent. 44 Thus, the
jury produces fewer winners than expected, while the judge produces
more winners.
Our conclusion, after a lengthy article based on a wealth of data
covering all sorts of cases, was that (1) the most plausible explanation
of the data lies in small differences between judges' and juries' treat-
ment of cases and, much more substantially, in the parties' varying the
selection of cases that reach judges and juries; (2) litigants' stereotypi-
cal views about juries may lead them to act unwisely in choosing be-
tween judge trials and jury trials; and (3) the surprising win rates in
product liability and medical malpractice cases may stem from the es-
pecially strong misperceptions litigants hold about judge and jury be-
havior in these cases.145 More simply put, certain groups of plaintiffs
do far better before judges, but the reason likely lies in prevailing mis-
perceptions about juries, rather than in differences between judges
and juries. Judges and juries are in fact not so different.
C. Persistence of Anecdote
Nevertheless, the old views based on anecdote persist. Despite
years of research that rebuts stereotypes about juries, every day lawyers
and policymakers act on the basis of those stereotypes. Why are such
misperceptions about the legal system so resilient? Why do the mis-
perceptions not eventually undergo correction, as lawyers repeatedly
observe the consequences of their misperceptions?
In general, longstanding misperceptions about the legal system
are not uncommon. 146 On the particular subject of jury/judge per-
142 See id. at 1161-62.
143 See id. at 1160-61.
144 See Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin
T. Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 743,
779 (2002); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 826-27 (2001) (discussing obstacles to unbiased decision
making common to judges and juries).
145 See Jury or Judge, supra note 124, at 1170-74.
146 See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab,
What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 501-02 (1989);
Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40
ARIz. L. REv. 717 (1998);James A. Henderson,Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolu-
tion in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 541
(1990). For discussions of the pitfalls inherent in human reasoning and social judgment
processes, see THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF
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formance, elitist perceptions of a biased and incompetent jury system
seem to conform to the natural order of things and can even be com-
forting. Persuasive and accessible empirical evidence to the contrary
has been slow in accumulating. Finally, many lawyers simply prefer to
rely on intuition informed by personal experience and anecdote. 147
All in all, lawyers' misperceptions of jury/judge differences have un-
derstandably prevailed for a long time.
If one accepts the new empirical evidence, however, practical les-
sons start to emerge. Returning to the same example of product lia-
bility and medical malpractice, one could conclude that the jury is less
of an advantage for plaintiffs, and the judge less of a disadvantage,
than other lawyers think. That realization should affect the terms of
settlement. Moreover, if only one side comes to that realization, that
side could manipulate the jury/judge choice to its bargaining
advantage.
V
JUDGMENT: HEREIN OF REALM OF UNKNOWNS
A. Award of Damages
Everyone knows that awards of damages have gone out of con-
trol .... Well, that is not quite true.1 48
Figure 5 shows, by its solid line, the median trial award for plain-
tiffs after a completed trial in tort cases of the general personal-injury
type. Except for an unexplained spike around 1990, those awards do
not seem to be out of control. Indeed, the ratio of mean tort award in
such cases to mean award in cases of the general contract type has
been decreasing in recent years. Even the ratio of mean award in all
product liability cases to the mean award in general contract cases is
decreasing.
HUMAN REASONING IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFER-
ENCE 195-296 (1980).
147 See generally Marc Galanter, The CivilJuy as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 227-51 (discussing the ways in which perceptions of the legal system are
shaped by anecdotal and experiential conceptions of juries and the litigation process).
148 See Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing
Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1129, 1132-36 (2001); see also
Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empiri-
cal Comparison 14 n.54 (Sept. 3, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(discussing tendency of even Administrative Office data to overstate somewhat the actual
damages awarded).
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FIGURE 5: AwARD OF DAMAGES IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS
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B. Foreigner Effect
Everyone knows that foreigners fare badly in U.S. courts ....
Well, that is not true either, according to our prior research. 149
In fact, foreign plaintiffs suing domestic defendants consistently
enjoy a higher win rate (80%) than domestic plaintiffs suing domestic
defendants (64%) in federal diversity and alienage actions.15 0 Like-
wise, foreign defendants sued by domestic plaintiffs fare better (50%)
than those domestic defendants sued by domestic plaintiffs. 151
Why? Our analysis rejected the implausible notion that U.S.
courts have a pro-foreigner bias, as well as the more plausible explana-
tion that foreign parties litigate better than domestic parties. 15 2 In-
stead, it appears that foreigners' fears of U.S. courts lead them to
149 See Xenophilia, supra note 24. But see Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American
Courts: An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation (Apr. 2, 2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors) (analyzing patent cases to conclude that foreigners do fare badly in
patent litigation, thereby further supporting the uniqueness of patent litigation, as sug-
gested supra note 136).
15o Xenophilia, supra note 24, at 1122-23.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1132-33.
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pursue only an unusually strong set of cases. 153 That is, foreigners are
averse to litigating here and hence are more selective in choosing
strong cases to pursue to judgment. When the foreigners do not en-
counter the expected level of bias, they end up winning more of their
cases. 154 So, it is case selection at work.
C. Determinants of Trial Outcome
A major point of this Article is that all of us know very little about
litigation realities. The realm of unknowns is vast. 155
What precisely determines who wins judgment lies within that
realm. However, the existing evidence, such as it is, suggests that our
trial courts perform with considerable neutrality. 156 The strength of
the case on the merits turns out to be the most important determinant
of outcome. 157 In brief, it appears that our civil justice system per-
forms quite well, "in a sober and predictable manner in important
and controversial areas."158
Most of the other stuff that we think we know by common knowl-
edge also belongs to that realm of unknowns. The realization of all
that we do not know should produce skepticism about accepted truths
based on anecdote, for example, with regard to the impact on out-
come of factors off the merits. But it should not produce pervasive
agnosticism, or knee-jerk rejection of empirical studies.1 59 Instead,
the preferable reaction would be to put common knowledge to the
test.
Sometimes common knowledge will turn out to be true after all,
as in the matter of the forum effect. 160 Sometimes it will turn out to
be false, as in the matter of the foreigner effect. 161 Although we could
not prove that anti-foreign bias is nonexistent in U.S. courts, we could
say that the available data do not support the view that U.S. courts
harbor xenophobic bias. 162 The data instead suggest that foreigners
would be wise to lessen their general aversion to litigation here. 163
153 Id. at 1133-34.
154 See id. at 1134.
155 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992).
156 See Defendants' Advantage, supra note 121, at 141-42.
157 See Jury or Judge, supra note 124, at 1152 & n.68.
158 Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 668; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial
Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1839 (2002) (showing
that juror demographics do not explain trial outcomes, although locale does matter).
159 See BEST, supra note 106, at 164-66.
160 See supra Part I.B.
161 See supra Part V.B.
162 Xenophilia, supra note 24, at 1132.
163 Id. at 1143.
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VI
APPEAL: HEREIN OF ASSAULT ON UNKNOWNS
A. Affirmance Effect
The striking feature about federal civil appeals-published and
unpublished-is the high rate of affirmance. Our work shows the af-
firmance rate to be about 80%. 16 4 While win rates in the trial court
can be high or low across case categories, affirmance rates in the ap-
pellate court remain elevated for all kinds of cases. 165
Figure 6 shows this pattern nicely, with some new data on judg-
ments for plaintiff or defendant after a completed trial in four case
categories: general contract, general personal-injury tort, medical mal-
practice, and jobs. 166 The lower set of four lines comprises the trial
win rates for those four case categories. Note that the win rates are
fairly steady over time, except for jobs, which has the lowest win rate
but one that has been gently increasing over the whole period. The
cluster of four lines near the top comprises recent years' affirmance
rates for those cases. Note how high the affirmance rates are, with
jobs being the highest. So, jobs cases are usually unsuccessful below,
and the trial result usually meets affirmance on appeal.
As we explained in an earlier article, this affirmance effect might
seem unsurprising at first glance. 67 One might expect a high affirm-
ance rate because of appellate deference to the district court's result.
One might even expect a high affirmance rate when review is de novo,
because of the tendency of experts to agree at about a 75% rate. 68
Combining the two expectations based on appellate deference and
expert agreement would push one's expected affirmance rate even
higher toward 80%. Appellate judges should and do lean toward af-
firmance as the usual course.
However, if the high affirmance rate is owing to those deference
and expertise factors, why do the parties not take them into account
and settle all but the close appeals, thereby whittling down that high
affirmance rate? The usual brand of case-selection theory says that
appeals should act like trials. 169 Appeals that clearly favor either the
appellant or the appellee would tend to be settled readily, because
both sides could save costs by so acting in light of their knowledge of
164 See Defendants'Advantage, supra note 121, at 130-34; Plaintiphobia, supra note 38, at
123.
165 See Jury or Judge, supra note 124, app. A; Plaintiphobia, supra note 38, at 107 tbl.2.
166 We describe the source of these data infta text accompanying note 174. As to the
affirmance rate, we could calculate it only from fiscal 1988, when the Administrative Office
started to code the district court docket number in the appellate data set. So far these data
extend only through fiscal 1997.
167 Defendants'Advantage, supra note 121, at 131-34.
168 See id. at 131.
169 See id. at 132 n.1l.
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FIGURE 6: WIN RATES AND AFFIRMANCE RATES FOR FEDERAL
CIVIL TRIALS
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all aspects of the case. Difficult appeals falling close to the applicable
decisional criterion would tend not to settle, because the parties
would be more likely to disagree substantially with respect to their
predicted outcomes. These unsettled, difficult appeals entailing diver-
gent expectations would fall more or less equally on either side of the
decisional criterion, regardless of both the position of that criterion
and the underlying distribution of cases. Case selection, then, should
leave for appellate adjudication a residue of appeals exhibiting some
nonextreme affirmance rate. Indeed, under simplifying assumptions,
and as a limiting implication, case-selection theorizing would even
predict a 50% affirmance rate. 170 That is clearly wrong, as the data
prove.
Thus, the persistently elevated affirmance rate suggests that settle-
ment is not very effective at the appellate stage in weeding out clear
cases. If every judgment underwent appeal, one would expect about
an 80% affirmance rate because of reviewers' deference and because
of experts' agreement. In fact, only a fraction of judgments undergo
170 See id. at 132 n.12.
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appeal-about a fifth171-and yet one nevertheless still sees an 80%
affirmance rate. It seems as if the parties have chosen to appeal, by
whatever selection method they employ, a set of cases that functions,
at least with regard to overall affirmance, as if it were a random sam-
pling. In sum, case selection apparently has a limited effect in system-
atically filtering the cases for adjudication on appeal.
Why would that be? Perhaps the failure to filter out clear appeals
is owing to appeals' not being very costly. 172 After slogging through
the trial court, the parties must see the small cost and effort in appeal-
ing as comparatively insignificant. Judgment below leaves the winner
feeling vindicated, the aggrieved loser wanting justice at long last.
Something telling emerges in the countless scenes on the evening
news in which losers immediately proclaim on the courthouse steps
their intention to appeal. About a fifth of losing parties decide that
they might as well stagger to the finish line, pretty much regardless of
the chances on appeal. Simply put, an 80% affirmance rate suggests
that the law should consider reform aimed at the efficiency of forcing
the would-be appellant to pause. A possible reform proposal would
involve shifting attorneys' fees on appeal to a losing appellant, which
would seem a fair condition of access to a second court for a party
already found to be in the wrong. 73
B. Plaintiff Effect
Our most recent series of articles used a new data set that we
constructed from the Administrative Office's data by linking federal
district court civil cases with their treatment in the federal courts of
appeals. 174 The results were surprising. Our original intent was to
study the jury/judge distinction on appeal, but the difference between
appellate treatments of these two streams of cases turned out to be
insignificant.175  The real story lay in plaintiff/defendant
differences. 1 76
171 See id. at 130-31, 154 & tbl.5; Plaintiphobia, supra note 38, at 105-06 & tbl.1, 119
tbl.5.
172 See Defendants'Advantage, supra note 121, at 133 & n.13.
173 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24J. LEGAL STUD.
379, 385, 421, 424 (1995) (suggesting a need for increased court fees on appeal).
174 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appel-
late Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Defendants'Advantage, supra note 121; Plaintiphobia,
supra note 38. For empirical work on the Supreme Court, see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SU-
PREME COURT (7th ed. 2001), and compare ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS (4th ed. 2001) (similar book in the same series, but treating the lower
courts); see alsOJEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITU-
DINAL MODEL REviSITED (2002) (using empirical approach to explain decision making as
based on the attitudes and values of the Justices).
175 See Defendants' Advantage, supra note 121, at 126-27, 130.
176 See Plaintiphobia, supra note 38, at 102-03.
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The data show that defendants succeed more than plaintiffs on
appeal. For example, defendants appealing their losses after trial ob-
tain reversals at a 33% rate, while losing plaintiffs succeed in only 12%
of their appeals from trials. 177 Therefore, defendants emerge from
the appellate court in a much better position than when they left the
trial court. That observation is fact.
Why would that be? This question takes us into speculation. We
think that the plaintiffs' lower reversal rate stems from real but hith-
erto unappreciated differences between appellate and trial courts.
Both descriptive analyses of the results and more formal regression
models dispel explanations based solely on case selection, and instead
support an explanation based on appellate judges' attitudes toward
trial-level adjudicators. The appellate judges may act on their percep-
tions of the trial courts as being pro-plaintiff. The appellate court
consequently would be more favorably disposed to the defendant than
are the trial judge and the jury. This appellate favoritism would be
appropriate if the trial courts were in fact biased in favor of the plain-
tiff. But as empirical evidence accumulates in refutation of trial court
bias on the plaintiff/defendant axis,1vs any such judicial perceptions
at the appellate level appear increasingly to be misperceptions. Alter-
natively, unconscious biases may be at work. Perhaps appellate
judges' greater distance from the trial process creates an environment
in which it is easier to discount harms to the plaintiff. In any event,
the data suggesting that appellate judges lean in favor of the defen-
dant become a cause for concern. In short, we think we have un-
earthed an anti-plaintiff effect in federal appellate courts that is
troublesome.
C. Determinants of Appellate Outcome
Another major point of this Article is that empirical methods, as
they push back the realm of unknowns, offer judges, practitioners,
and policymakers some really practical lessons. We may not know pre-
cisely what determines who prevails on appeal, 79 but we are begin-
ning to understand some of the factors involved.
For instance, emerging from our appellate research, our thesis is
a simple one: misperceptions exist, and they have effects. Widespread
misperceptions of the trial process exist. These misperceptions could
affect appellate outcome. The discovery of a plaintiffs' disadvantage
on appeal may contain lessons for appellate judges. Any suppositions
about trial court and jury biases should cease to affect appellate deci-
177 Id. at 106.
178 See supra Part V.C.
179 On the uncertain role of party wealth and experience, for example, see Plain-
tiphobia, supra note 38, at 122.
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sions. Each appellate judge could approach that goal by realizing that
some commonly held views are misperceptions, and by recognizing
that the role of these misperceptions in appellate decision making is
undesirable.
Likewise, the affirmance effect would seem to impart a lesson to
practitioners who are weighing the advisability of appealing a loss. All
too frequently, an appeal is a waste of money. Meanwhile, policymak-
ers should perhaps augment the expense to the participants, in order
to further discourage appeals.
CONCLUSION
Data are good.
